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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE LEGAL STATUS OF MEMBERS OF THE
OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS

By

ELBRIDGE COLBY*

F

ROm many of the colleges of the country each June there are
graduated approximately 6,000 students who have earned during their four academic years, in addition to their diplomas, commissions as lieutenants in the Officers' Reserve Corps. These commissions give these young gentlemen a special status, different from
that of their fellows. It is a preferential status, securing for them
opportunity for selection for duty with the Civilian Conservation
Corps in these days of depression, and in time of war, when as
Mr. Justice Brewer said, "the government has the right to the
military service of all its able-bodied citizens,"1 insuring for them
positions as commissioned officers instead of subordinate positions
in the ranks. Such a special status has certain correlative duties
and responsibilities, and possibly certain disabilities. It shall be
our purpose to investigate this status, to determine how far in
accepting the sabre-even though still peacefully sheathed-the
young reserve lieutenant has waived any rights as a citizen, or
surrendered any personal liberties, as does the youth who enters
the regular army.'
The scope of the problem is sufficiently broad to affect some
two hundred thousand persons in all parts of tfie country. Under
article I, section 6 of the constitution, no "person holding any office
under the United States" may serve as a member of Congress
during his continuance in office. Under article II,section 1, no
"person holding an office of trust or profit under the United
States" may be appointed a presidential elector. Under article I,
section 9, no such person may, without the consent of Congress, accept any present, emolument, office or title from any foreign state.
Many other such disabilities are imposed upon officers of the
United States by state constitutions-as, for example, the provision in article 4, section 9 of the Minnesota constitution, that
they may not serve in the legislature-as well as by statute, and
*Major, United States Army; Department of Military Science, University of Vermont.
'In re Grimley, (1890) 137 U. S. 147, 11 Sup. Ct. 54, 34 L. Ed. 636.
2
United States v. Clark, (C.C. Mich. 1887) 31 Fed. 710.
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by administrative regulations. Is a Reserve Officer so far an
"officer of the United States" that his political and other privileges
are thus curtailed?
Historically speaking, the Officers' Reserve Corps, and the
Organized Reserves of the Army of the United States to which the
corps furnishes trained commissioned personnel, mark the third
and final stage of popular military protection among free peoples.
The first stage was a combined tribal and feudal stage out of which
grew the militia of the people arming to furnish proper quotas for
war-time defense, as instanced in the Anglo-Saxon fyrd, in the
ancient Assize of Arms and the Statute of Westminster. The
second stage came in the era of national monarchies from about
1500 onwards, when troops were hired to fight the country's
battles and the populace at large was not directly burdened therewith. Royal troops were supported by royal funds. The people
went about their businesses and occupations undisturbed by national wars. The mass of the population came to think of armed
effort being entrusted almost exclusively to a separate and distinct
class of professional soldiers, like the Swiss Guards of the Bourbons, the Hessian mercenaries of the Hanoverians, or the more
national troopers recruited or "pressed" for service in the home
country. But this stage could not long continue in a world moving
toward democracy. Even before the people of 1789 distrusted
the royal troops loyal to the King of France and his Austrian
wife, even before the people of Britain feared the standing forces
of Charles Stuart and Oliver Cromwell in the 1640's, even back
at the beginnings of modern liberal political philosophy in Magna
Carta in 1215, there was objection to the foreign mercenaries with
whom John Lackland was said to have been "oppressing" the true
Englishmen.
The third stage is the modern stage, with grave emergencies
and extensive wars enlisting the support of all available man power,
like the enthusiastic enrollments and conscriptions of the wars of
the French Revolution, the American Civil War, and the World
War. With modern popular participation in government and
with modem armed conflicts requiring tremendous military efforts
and enrollments far in excess of what might appropriately be maintained in time of peace without hampering economic development,
sound policy dictates dependence upon civilian support-voluntaiy
or conscripted-rather than merely upon the "standing army" or
the "peace establishment." It also dictates peacetime preparation
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-voluntary or conscripted-for such civilian support. All who
participate in the government and enjoy its benefits are presumed
available for the support of that government in time of war,3 and
4
properly trainable to that end.
Although the history of the United States does not reach back
far enough in point of time to give contemporaneous examples of
these practices, it does show in a century and a half, in microcosm,
the successive stages of the changing policy. The Minute Men of
Lexington and Concord and the trained militia of Massachusetts
Bay who reported to the Commander-in-Chief at Cambridge and
enabled him to force the British from Boston were, under colonial
conditions, typical of the initial militia idea-the commoners who
participate in government likewise participating in the defense of
the ideals of that government. For the second stage we may take
the total neglect of the Militia Act of May 8, 1792, which provided
for nation-wide peace-time enrollment yet was never carried into
effect because the new nation clung more generally to the "standing army" theory in time of peace and, save when particular perils
confronted the country, seemed to consider even its infinitesimally
small professional force sufficient for any contingencies. Even our
experiences with "draft" laws in the Civil War did not lead to
universal military service, or to any consistent attempts toward the
utilization of national manpower on a large scale. The United
States entered the Spanish War of 1898, the Mexican imbroglio
of 1916, and the World War, without mobilization plans. Evidently
it was considered that the "regular" army could handle any
emergency, as it had handled the Indian campaigns.
After the Armistice and the subsequent return of the American Expeditionary Force from overseas, a new and comprehensive
military policy was adopted by the national legislators in the form
of the National Defense Act of 19205 in an attempt to follow for
the future the war-time admonition of Woodrow Wilson: "It is
not an army we must shape and train for war: it is a people." The
new law6 provided that the Army of the United States should consist of three component parts, divided into brigades, divisions, and
3
Arver v. United States, (1918) 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup Ct. 159, 62
L. Ed.
349.
4
Hamilton v. Regents, (1934) 293 U. S. 245, 55 Sup. Ct. 197, 79 L.
Ed. 343.
5J. G. Harbord in Atlantic Monthly, Sept. 1923, p. 340.
041 Stat. at L. 759. The full title of this act is: "An Act to amend an
Act entitled 'An Act for making further and more effectual provision for
the national defense, and for other purposes,' approved June 3, 1916, 'and to
establish military justice.'
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higher units in such a manner as to form the basis of a complete
and immediate mobilization of the man power of the country; and
that these units should be allocated to localities throughout the
nation in accordance with the distribution of the potential military
population. The three components were defined as: (1) the
Regular Army, (2) the National Guard, and (3) the Organized
Reserves, perpetuating the names, the traditions, and the personnel
-so far as possible-of the famous combat divisions of the World
War. As Secretary of War, John W. Weeks said:
"In the past the source of our military forces was not known
until the outbreak of war. Now we are making complete provisions during peace, and practically every village will contain
some citizens who have taken the oath to serve in either the National Guard or Organized Reserves."'7
The National Guard is, of course, under state rather than
federal control, save in particular contingencies foreseen by law
when it is federalized by legal methods.' The Organized Reserves,
however, represent a widespread federal effort to disseminate
civic responsibility and some modicum of military training and
military leadership among the people, in large cities and in small
towns.0 In this organization, the reserve officer holds a key position. The question as to whether this is a potential or an actual
federal force, as to whether the reserve officer not on active duty
is a federal officer, may in perfectly possible circumstances become
a serious problem in constitutional law. 10
Officers of the reserve corps are appointed and commissioned
by the president. 1 The form of commission issued to them reads:
"Know ye that reposing special trust and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities of . . . I do appoint him, etc.,"

and further provides: "He will enter upon active duty under this
commission only when specifically 6rdered to such active duty
by competent authority." The office they occupy is established by
an act of Congress, which may be a pertinent fact,' 2 particularly
as the appointment is "by the president alone." 13 Those so com7Address at the War College, Washington, D.C. and quoted in the
Army and Navy Journal, June 30, 1923, p. 1059.
8Legal Status of the National Guard (1925) 98 Cent. L. J. 240.
OSpeech of Gen. J. J. Pershing at New York, Nov. 11, 1922.
lMartin v. Mott, (1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 19, 6 L. Ed. 537; Tennessee v. Davis, (1879) 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. Ed. 648; In re Fair, (C.C.
Neb. 1900) 100 Fed. 149.
"Sec. 37, Act of June 4, 1920, 41 Stat. at L. 759, 75.
1-Carrington v. United States, (1908) 208 U. S. 1, 28 Sup. Ct. 203,
52 L. Ed. 367.
"3Sec. 37 Act of June 4, 1920, as amended, ut supra.
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missioned are required to take the oath of office prescribed by section 1757, Revised Statutes. 14 When ordered to active duty they
are, until relieved by competent authority, subject not only to the
rules and articles of war, but to all applicable orders and regulations governing the army. 11 The law states that "save in the event
of a national emergency expressly declared by Congress" they may
not be ordered to active duty without their own consent for more
than fifteen days in any single calendar year. 1 Naturally, the
ordering of reserve officers to active duty, for whatever period of
time, is dependent upon appropriations by Congress for that specific
purpose; but it is especially to be noted that no statutory limitation is placed upon the ordering of reserve officers to active duty
for periods of fifteen days or less, regardless of their consent, or
of the existence of a national emergency.
This is the law. Army Regulations, however, dictate a policy
of limiting such orders to active duty to reserve officers who desire
such duty, and say: "In order that undue hardship may not be
worked on individual officers on account of conflict with business
or personal affairs, corps area commanders will excuse officers
from such active duty upon their written request." 17 The force
of this last sentence may not be fully understood by persons not
in the military service. The phrase "will excuse" is a positive
order to corps area commanders to excuse such persons, and goes
far beyond a mere statement of desirable policy; such is the traditional meaning of "will" in military usage. As far as the law
goes, the reserve officer is directly subject to peace-time calls for
less than fifteen days. Army Regulations temporarily protect his
convenience more than does the law. Under the law, obedience to
the call to active duty is beyond his control. It is in the discretion
of the government. Under the law he is bound to obey. He is
subject to the articles of war from the time he might be expected
to obey-as well as from the time he does actually begin to obeythe order for such a call to active duty. In view of these facts, it
has been said that a member of the Officers' Reserve Corps holds
an office of trust under the United States in the constitutional
sense ;18that the Officers' Reserve Corps being a part of the Army
' 4Opinions Judge Adjutant General (hereinafter referred to as Ops.

J.A.G.) 210.4, Nov. 1, 1918; Ibid., 210.5, Sept. 7, 1922.
15Ops. J. A. G., 400.321, Jan. 28, 1922; Dig. Ops. J. A. G. 1922, p. 27.
'6Act of June 4, 1920, sec. 37a, 41 Stat. at L. 759, 776.
17Army Regulations 140-5 (1931) par. 54, a.
18 Ops. J. A. G. 210.4, Nov. 1, 1918; Ibid., 210.5, Sept. 7, 1922.
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of the United States, members of the Officers' Reserve Corps are
"Officers of the Army."' 19
Principally, however, the problem does not concern the active
duty status of reserve officers. That seems too obvious for discussion. The real problem is whether or not, while not on active
duty, such a reserve officer is "an officer of the army" holding an
"office of trust under the United States." A decade or more ago
the judge advocate general of the-Army so believed,' even though
he was quite certain that inactive reserve officers are not subject
to courts-martial or the articles of war."
The basic theory underlying the Organized Reserves-the
theory of localized units, locally officered by civilians holding reserve commissions and prepared to function properly and promptly
upon the occurrence of a national emergency-implies a considerable degree of peace-time training and peace-time assumption of
responsibility on the part of members of the Officers' Reserve
Corps. Yet the training required for efficient preparation for and
performance of such possible duties is far greater than can be given
within the customary, limited periods of active duty service. What
is called "training on an inactive status" is going on all the time.
Periodic meetings of groups of reserve officers in adjacent
neighborhoods, voluntary attendance at lecture and study hours,
guided reading in military tactics and technique, and enrollment in
extension correspondence courses for reserve officers, are now
depended upon for a good deal of the training needed.22 The officer
of the Reserve Corps on an inactive status may be, until called to
service, "in the status of a civilian,' 23 but the officers of the Reserve Corps throughout the country have a feeling that they must
contribute tangibly to the military work, which, in such a large
degree, now depends upon "the voluntary service of patriotic young
men." 2" A committee of such officers serving temporarily with the
"oOps. J. A. G. 400.321, Jan. 28, 1922; Dig. Ops. J. A. G., Jan.-Dec.

1922, p. 27.

2oSee note 18 and 19 supra.
"'Art. War II, Act June 4, 1920, 41 Stat. at L. 759, 787.

See the
interesting case of a reserve officer on inactive status, not legally ordered
to duty, who could not be tried for an offense committed in a governmentowned airplane while making a practice flight at his own request. Ops.
J. A. G. 250.419, Feb 9, 1921. Digest Ops. J. A. G. Jan.-June 1921, p. 24.
2-Army Regulations 140-5, par. 64; Adjutant General of the Army,
Letter of Instruction to Commanders, July 3, 1922; Compilation of Opinions
on National Defense 118.
230p. J. A. G. 474, Sept. 12, 1921. Digest Ops. J. A. G., July-December
1922, p. 16.
21Statement by President Warren G. Harding, June 13, 1921. Compilation of Opinions on National Defense 133-134.
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Operations and Training Division of the War Department General
Staff to frame recommendations as to the amount and character
of active duty training and inactive duty training to be expected
of their fellow reserve officers, declared in a report submitted
April 11, 1925:
"Each and every reserve officer ... is in fact an officer of the
Army of the United States, not merely when called to active duty,
but at all times."
This statement is so plain, and the implications of the administration of their activities are so similar to the case of regular officers of the Army, that we must pause and consider more clearly.
Since that report was written-indeed, since any of the opinions
of the judge advocate general of the army in this connection already cited were framed there has been an interesting bit of legislation. To that section of the National Defense Act which defined
the Officers' Reserve Corps, there were added, in 1930, the following words:
"Members of the Officers' Reserve Corps, while not on active
duty, shall not, by reason solely of their appointments, oaths, commissions, or status as such, or any duties or functions performed
or pay or allowances received as such, be held or deemed to be
officers or employees of the United States, or persons holding any
office of trust or profit or discharging any official function under
or in connection with any department of the Government of the
United States." 25
This relatively recent legislation reflects an attempt to avoid
placing the patriotic civilian volunteer worker in this field under
any disability in connection with his personal affairs. After all,
these inactive reserve officers are not functioning as officers of the
United States, they are merely potential officers-shall we say
officers in name only-and their principal activity as officers is in
training to function as officers. The sole objects of the War
Department's relations toward the reserve officer are:
(1) To prepare him to perform efficiently the duties of his
mobilization assignment.
(2) To prepare him for promotion to the next higher grade.2 '
In spite of this general attitude, the War Department has placed
upon them certain restrictions. They are not to join the Coast
Guard, the Public Health Service, or the Coast and Geodetic
25
Section 37, Act of July 1, 1930 (46 Stat. at L. 841) and Section 37,
Act of June 15, 1933, (48 Stat. at L. 153). Army Regulations 140-5, par.
79. 6
2 Army Regulations 140-5, paragraph 60 (1931).
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Survey without leaving the Reserve Corps, for the two are considered incompatible.27 They are not to engage in or permit their
names to be connected with any activity, participation in which is
incompatible with the status of an officer of the army.2 8 "The
entry of a reserve officer into the military service of a foreign
country or his departure from the United States or any territory
thereof for such purpose will be cause for his immediate discharge." ' It might be thought that these attitudes seem to indicate, even in this recent regulation of 1931, a tendency still to
consider the reserve officer as holding an "office of trust" under the
government and, in spite of the legislation of 1930, as still "an
officer of the United States."30 Such was indeed the former ruling,
well illustrated perhaps by the refusal of the War Department to
permit a member of the Officers' Reserve Corps to accept honorary rank in the Bolivian army as an instructor in aviation, saying:
"One holding a commission in the Officers' Reserve Corps holds
an office in the army, (Ops. J.A.G. 324.4 Dec. 29, 1917; Ops.
J.A.G., April-December 1917, p. 279) and therefore an office of
trust under the United States within the meaning of sec. 9, article
I of the constitution, prohibiting the acceptance of any office or
title from any foreign state without the consent of Congress." 31
Now, with the 1930 legislation in force, we find the State Department making a similar ruling. On April 11, 1934, it was said:"The Government of the United States disapproves of American citizens taking service in the armed forces of any foreign government and if Americans do so it is on their sole responsibility
and risk and they cannot look to their own government for protection while in such service. Americans holding reserve commissions in our army will forfeit
them if they enter the military
32
service of a foreign country."
The ruling may have been the same, but its basis was different.
It is based upon a general disapproval which extends to the actions
of all citizens, not of reserve officers alone. It is based upon
"The policy of this government, with regard to actual or potential conflicts between countries on the American continent, to give
all possible assistance toward a peaceful settlement, but to refrain
scrupulously from permitting its facilities to be used by either
party in preparation for possible hostilities."
2

Army Regulations 140-5, paragraph 74, a.
82, b.
74, f.

2
Army Regulations 140-5, paragraph
20
Army Regulations 140-5, paragraph
3
OVide ut supra, notes 18 and 19.
3

lOps. J. A. G. 210.14 May 7, 1920; Digest Ops. J. A. G. May 1920
pp. 56-7.
3"State Department Press Release, April 11, 1934.
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And certainly, the use of aviators trained to fly in army schools,
given reserve commissions, and then sent home to civil life, would
be utilizing for the benefit of a foreign government the training
which the United States government has given for its own use.
With the 1930 legislation saying such reservists are not "officers"
the State Department four years later makes its objection and
frames its practice on broad grounds. Similarly the War Department can stand on broad grounds. It can say that the things
which its current regulations forbid reserve officers to do are improper, in the sense of being contrary to regulations, and forfeiting
the status of an officer, without going so far as to say they are
otherwise illegal.
Let us see what this "office of trust," or position of an "officer
of the United States" amounts to. In a measured opinion, the
Supreme Court of the United States has said:
"An officer of the United States is one appointed by the president, a court of law, or the head of a department. (const. art, II,
sec. 2) . . . An 'office or place of trust' within a constitutional

provision prohibiting persons holding any office or place of trust
under the United States . . . means a public position involving a

delegation to the individual of some part of the sovereign functions
of the government to be exercised for the public benefit." 3
The question of pay is immaterial. Of course reserve officers
not on active duty do not draw pay; indeed, they may for purposes
of "training and instruction" perform duty on an "inactive" status
"by attachment to active units of the Regular Army," and still
without pay.3 4 Such reserve officers serve without pay, on their
own application, and not under formal orders. The real question
hinges upon the question of responsibilities and of trust. It was
once held that the office of commissioner of the United States
Centennial Commission was 'an office of trust' within the meaning
of the constitutional provision.
"It is not an office of profit under the United States, for the
commissioners are not entitled to any pay from the United States,
nor to any perquisite or emolument under any law of the United
States. But we think it is an office of trust. It is true that
originally the United States had no pecuniary interest in the exhibition. .

.

. From the time the government gave its sanction to

the exhibition, and especially after the president issued his proclamation, the honor and reputation of the United States were pledged
for its proper management to its own citizens and to foreign na33
34United

States v. Germaine, (1878) 99 U. S. 508, 25 L. Ed. 482.
Arrny Regulations 140-5, par. 64, a, (5).
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tions. From that time the honor and reputation of the United
States were largely in the keeping of the commissioners; and in
this view there is a very delicate and important trust imposed in
them. It would be a narrow, and we think an improper interpretation, to hold that an office is an office of trust only when the
officer has the handling of public money or property, or the 3care
and oversight of some pecuniary interest of the government."
Even though he receives no pay, the reserve officer not on
active duty is appointed by the president according to law. He is
part of a carefully systematized organization. In a military sense
we might say, in the very words which an ex-president used in
another sense: "The federal government maintains its personal
presence in every local community throughout the vast stretch of
national jurisdiction." 36 In the state of New York, the law officials
have ruled that the reserve officer is a part of the army, and since
as such he must provide himself with equipment for service in the
field, the state has no right to interfere with the "maintenance of
the United States Army" and the reserve officer in that state cannot be bound by penal provisions against owning a pistol.3 7 In the
state of Texas, reserve officers of the federal establishment were
formerly forbidden to hold public office.38
It should of course be at once apparent that the definition and
the enforcement of any understanding concerning any "office of
profit or trust" under the federal government may likely be as
various as the total number of states in the Union. Under the old
territorial government of Minnesota39 it was provided that "no
person holding a commission or appointment under the United
States, except postmasters, shall be a member of the legislative
assembly." After this jurisdiction achieved statehood, in one of
its original passages the constitution of the state of Minnesota
(1857) has continued to provide that "no senator or representative (in the state legislature) shall, during the time for wlich he
35In re Corliss, (1876) 11 R. I. 638, 23 Am. Dec. 538.
'11Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers 59.
371920 Ops. Atty. Gen. N. Y. 165. Note that the War Department had
held that a Reserve Officer has not, by virtue of his commission, the
privilege of carrying a pistol in a state where the carrying of such weapons
is prohibited except under state license. Ops. J. A. G. 474, Sept. 12, 1921.
Dig. Ops. J. A. G. July-December 1921, p. 16. Now the War Department
says that "reserve officers when called to active duty are entitled to the
privilege of having issued to them all necessary arms and equipment."
(Army Regulations, (1931) 140-5, par. 86). Now the articles which he is
to purchase omit any reference to "arms". (Ibid., par. 84).
permitted
38
Sec. 33, art. 16, constitution of Texas. Amended in 1932 to exclude
reserve officers of the United States.
39(1849) 9 Stat. at L. 403.
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is elected, hold any office under the authority of the United States,
except that of postmaster." MI[ore conventional wording was used
in a New England state, where the constitution of Vermont provides that no person holding any "office of profit or trust under the
authority of Congress" shall be eligible "to any appointment in the
legislature or to any executive or judiciary office under this state,"
with the word "office" further defined as "any office created directly
or indirectly by Congress, and for which emolument is provided
from the treasury of the United States." This Vermont constitutional provision has been applied by the courts of that state, which
held that acceptance of a state office vacated the federal office, and
went so far as to hold, under the de facto rule, that acts of ineligible officers (a justice of the peace in McGregor v. Balch, 40 and
a chief of police in State v. Clark,41) were binding and valid as
against third parties and the general public. The Vermont provision was invoked legislatively in 1841 to unseat and exclude State
Senator Daniel W. Aiken for concurrently holding a postmastership.

42

We may return for a moment to constitutional law. The Act of
July 9, 1918, 41 authorized any and all members of the military

forces serving in the World War to accept medals and decorations
from foreign governments and gave, in blanket form, the consent
of Congress required therefor by article I, section 9, clause 8 of
the constitution. The consent granted by that act expired after
the termination of the War. It has been stated by the War Department that, after the expiration of the time limit provided for
in the Act of July 9, 1918, an officer of the Reserve Corps, whether
in active or inactive status, cannot lawfully accept a decoration.44
40(1842) 14 Vt. 428.
41(1872) 44 Vt. 636.
42
Journal of the State Senate of Vermont, 1841, pp. 41, 47, 50, 55.
Compare the dictum of the Minnesota court, interpreting the Minnesota constitutional provision in State ex rel. Anderson v. Erickson
(1930) 180 Minn. 246, 230 N. W. 637, that "The prohibition against
the holding of 'any office under the authority' of either the United
States or the state 'except that of postmaster' is plainly intended to
include every office created or existing under the state or national authority excepting only that of postmaster."
See also the opinion of the attorney general of Minnesota, under
date of May 5, 1933, addressed to State Senator Patrick L. Farnand,
to the effect that by virtue of this provision a member of the legislature
is not eligible to election as a delegate to a convention called to ratify
an amendment to the constitution of the United States.
4340
Stat. at L. 845, 872.
44
Ops. J.A. G., 210.5, Sept. 7, 1922. Digest Ops. J.A. G., Jan-Dec.
1922, p. 17. Ops. J.A. G., 326.21, Apr. 27, 1923. Digest Ops. J.A. G.,
193, p. 6.
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Thus when European nations showered decorations upon Lindbergh for his trans-Atlantic flight in 1927, it was necessary for
Congress to enact special legislation to permit him, as a reserve
officer, properly to accept them.41 Without formally raising the
question with the official authorities, one reserve officer has accepted such a decoration from a foreign state. No one has raised the
question and probably no one will, in the case of this distinguished
physician. Similarly the War Department a decade ago had to
rule that the same constitutional provision prohibits an officer of
the Reserve Corps from acting as publicity and commercial representative of a foreign government if such action should involve-as
it probably would-appointment to office under the foreign state
or emolument from such state, 40 just as a federal marshal in
Florida was denied by the Department of Justice permission to act
4
as consular agent for a foreign state. 7
In all of these early decisions, the War Department has tried
to do everything possible in the way of legal interpretation to preserve the civil freedom of action of the reserve officer, feeling that
as little restriction as possible should be placed upon the civilian
activities of Reserve Officers when they are not on active duty.4"
The Reserve Corps was initially established by the Act of June 3,
1916 "for the purpose of inducing civilians to render themselves
liable to call into the army in time of actual or threatened hostilities."48 The department has said:
"It is preposterous to think that Congress intended to deprive
of a part of their professional opportunities the members of a large
and important class who should offer their services to their government."50
In line with these opinions of the War Department and the
desire of the department to carry out a very liberal policy, the judge
advocate general has refused to give a blanket decision, however
clear the purely constitutional aspects of the problem might be,
saying that although the reserve officer is "an officer of the army"
and "holds an office of trust" under the constitution, he "is not
necessarily, however, an officer of the United States within the
4

5Army and Navy Register, June 4, 1927. See also statute authorizing
it. Act of Congress approved March 7, 1928 (45 Stat. 1709).
40
6 ps. J. A. G., 326.21 Apr. 27, 1923. Digest Ops. J. A. G., 1923,

p. 6.

Ops. Atty. Gen. 409.
0ps. J. A. G., 210.43, Oct. 17, 1924.
4939 Stat. at L. 166, sec. 37.
46

48

5ODigest Ops. J. A. G., Jan. 1919, p. 7.
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purview of a particular act of Congress." 5 1 Whenever possible,
therefore, the War Department has held that the reserve officer
52

is in the status of a civilian.

Upon some occasions it was not possible for the War Department to decide the issue. Twice, however, in other fields, the
civilian status of the reserve officer was upheld as the department
would wish it to be, both times for the benefit of members of the
legal profession. The Department of the Interior was prevailed
upon to rule in favor of lawyers who held reserve commissions
being permitted to practice before that department, like other
citizens. The penal statute which made it an offense for "an officer of the United States" to aid or assist, or act as agent or
attorney, in the prosecution of any claim against the government,
appeared to bar reserve officers.5 3 Nevertheless, it was decided
after some discussion that a member of the Reserve Corps not on
active duty is not "an officer of the United States" within the
meaning of that particular statute. This decision was arrived at
on the rather tenuous grounds that the penal statute in question
was passed "at a time when no such thing as an Officers' Reserve
Corps existed" and Congress could not have contemplated its application to the officers of said corps.54
The second definite test of the legal abilities or disabilities of
reserve officers occurred before a federal court. A distinguished
attorney of the District of Columbia who held a commission in the
Officers' Reserve Corps, appeared before the Court of Claims to
plead a cause, and asked for a ruling as to his competency so to
appear. It was already well settled that for an "officer of the
United States" to appear and argue a case for a plaintiff would
subject such an officer as is contemplated by R. S. 5498 to the
penalties provided." It was pointed out that the reserve officer
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on inactive status has no salary or emoluments of office. It was
said that he had no defined duties to discharge. It was felt that his
position was more analogous to that of an officer honorably discharged from the service than to that of a retired officer. It was
finally decided that "his prosecution of a claim for a plaintiff in
the Court of Claims of the United States is not in contravention
of the letter or spirit of R. S. 5498."'z If this decision seems inconsistent with that in the case of the centennial commissioner and
with the present scope and variety of the inactive duties of the
reserve officers today, it is at least indicative of the tendency to
prevent membership in the Reserve Corps from working a hardship upon civilian workers, and notably o2 the tendency to interpret statutes-as distinct from constitutional provisions-in a
sense that will envisage reservists as something different from
"officers of the United States."
It was as a result of this tendency, of course, that the movement got under way to secure, among the amendments to be enacted
in 1930 to the Act of 1920, which consisted principally of amendments to the Act of 1916, some provision which would seem to
relieve reserve officers of the disability or danger of the disability
which they might incur under municipal law by being considered
in all respects "officers of the United States." But in certain respects, the War Department was impotent to make recommendations. Even if the Act of 1930 should say that members of the
Officers' Reserve Corps are not "officers" of the United States nor
hold "any office of trust" under the government of the United
States ' 67 there are still matters which are outside the power of such
a law to regulate with finality.
During the month before the presidential election of 1924,
thirteen candidates for the office of presidential elector resigned
their commissions in the Officers' Reserve Corps. One of these
had addressed an inquiry to the adjutant general of the Army,
asldng if his position as a reserve officer might make him ineligible
to be a candidate for the electoral college, in view of the constitutional provision that "no Senator or Representative or person
303, 8 Sup. Ct. 505, 31 L. Ed. 463.
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holding an office of trust or profit under the United States shall be
appointed an elector."58 The inquiry was turned over to the judge
advocate general of the Army whose opinion, when transmitted to
the inquirer, was given to the press, and precipitated the baker's
dozen of resignations, so that on the final list of electors chosen
at the November balloting no name of any reserve officer appeared.
The judge advocate general seemed to believe that even a reserve
officer not on active duty held an office of trust, and would be ineligible; and recommended that the inquirer be advised that "in
the event of his resignation as a reserve officer the War Department will be glad to receive his application for reappointment at
the proper time," and declared categorically that: "The question
whether or not a person is qualified to be a presidential elector is
not one that the War Department has the power to decide." '0
The individual electors whose eligibility might have been made
the subject of a test case avoided the issue by resigning their reserve commissions. The problem never reached the only body
whose function it is to decide-Congress or some special electoral
commission created perhaps upon the model of the Commission of
1876; nor was it presented in any form to a court.
The fact that any challenge of an elector's eligibility would
probably be decided upon strictly party lines, rather than upon
legal grounds, was taken by some interested persons as foreshadowing the worthlessness of any "test case" in establishing precedent.
Even with a majority in the electoral college so substantial as not
to depend upon the outcome of any such challenge, it was felt that
the determination would still be grounded in politics, rather than
in law or reason. Nor did it seem that such a determination would
have any moral force. A close vote and a bitter issue like that
of 1876, with weeks of campaigning arousing popular excitement
over the results and heavy party pressure exerted, would probably
again insure votes according to the methods, minds, and habit.;
of politicians, i.e., along strictly party lines.60 It may perhaps be
taken for granted that this problem may never be settled, at least
not in this way, with any binding force.
In the minds of those who discussed the problem at that time,
however, the scrutiny of possibilities brought to light certain
other interesting complications. It developed that in Congress
of the United States, article II, section 1, clause 2.
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there were several legislators who held reserve commissions. The
five-year commission of a famous Senator was about to expire.
He had just been read out of his own party for his insurgency. He
refrained from applying for reappointment as a reserve officer.
If he had, and if his party-then in the majority-had sought to
challenge his competency to sit as a member of the Senate, they
might have claimed him to be as a reserve officer already "an
officer of the United States" and therefore ineligible to election as
a senator. One legal aspect of the reserve commission might have
been decided, although only for that Congress and that session,
and for that political occasion and senator only.
It likewise developed that in the lower chamber there were
eight Republican representatives and one Democratic representative who were reserve officers. Among these there could be
counted four distinguished service medals for heroism under fire,
and several valid foreign decorations. Several of these were known
to be very active in Reserve Corps and Organized Reserve affairs.
One of them was "in command" of a "regiment" of the Organized
Reserves, with "orders" being issued from regimental headquarters in his name, that is by an executive officer "by order of Colonel
B-I-a-n-k." The competency of these reserve officers to sit as
members of Congress is of course, like the competency of the
other reserve officers to serve as presidential electors, not for determination by the War Department. Each house of Congress is
the judge of its own membership. The question has not been
seriously nor publicly raised in a single individual case. If there
be any precedent in the matter, it is a precedent of negative action,
a precedent of tacit approval. Conspicuous congressmen from
New York, Ohio, Tennessee, and Maryland have indicated in the
Congressional Directory their current connections with the Reserve Corps, and no challenge arose. One very distinguished
congressman-colonel has even outdone the House Representative
who had orders issued in his name, even though he was on an inactive status. The extreme case is of a representative who during
a recess was called to active duty for an extended period of time,
and ordered to Europe in connection with foreign military negotiations on a disarmament conference-all of course with his own
consent. Yet, as has been said, the issue never has been squarely
raised and we may never know, save through implication, whether
the reserve commission should bar a citizen from legislative duties
and opportunities under the federal government.
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Finally we face the problem of proper interpretation of the
effects and the finality of the phrase added to the National Defense
Act of 1920 by the amendment of 1930, saying that a reserve
officer categorically is not "an officer of the United States," and
holds "no office of trust or profit" under the government of the
United States.
By such legislative interpretation of the character of an office
which it creates in fact, Congress is perfectly well able to bind the
executive departments of the government. The War Department
will see its judge advocate changing his tune and reversing a host
of antecedent opinions, if such reversal becomes necessary by
reason of the receipt of inquiries. By such an interpretation,
Congress may perhaps bind the Department of Justice, and remove
forever the remote possibility of any governmental legal action
against reserve officers for activities they might take part in not
consonant with a position as "officer of the United States." By
such an interpretation the Congress may remove the purely administrative and executive objections to reserve officers accepting
decorations from foreign governments, for such an interpretation
specifically defines them as not coming within the constitutional
prohibition.
Most of the decisions which concern this matter were rendered
prior to 1930, and there is a great paucity of decisions since that
time. It is perfectly proper to inquire however as to how fully
Congress can do what Congress has presumed to do in this instance.
Is the statement that a reserve officer is not an officer of the
United States binding upon future Congresses with regard to the
eligibility of reserve officers to sit as members of either House?
Although this might be taken as a general statement of policy by
Congress, the answer must be negative. Each House is the judge
of its own membership. One session is not bound by the precedents established by an earlier session. In this respect the phrase
in the amendments of 1930 is without force.
Is this legislative statement binding as regards the qualifications
of prospective members of the electoral college? Again the answer
is negative. Eligibility, the right to sit, and the right to represent a
particular state in the electoral college, are not determined by acts
of Congress.
Is this statement binding as regards the State Department and
the War Department, as to acceptance of decorations, entering into
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office or securing employment under a foreign government? The
answer is probably in the affirmative, for these departments have
always properly considered themselves the servants of the state.
But practically speaking, the statement is of negligible force. The
War Department has not taken action against Reserve Officers who
have accepted decorations from foreign governments, and will
keep right on permitting them to accept them. The State Department, if it takes any action, as it is likely to do-even in spite of
the phrases in the law of 1930-will take such action on the
grounds that "American citizens" should not foster rebellion,
revolt, and war in foreign countries, just as we have seen it do
with regard to Colombia in April of 1934.61

Is this statement binding upon courts of law? Of course it
makes no difference whether or not it is binding upon the Court
of Claims, for that court has already for all practical purposes
adopted that very interpretation.12 But it is to be seriously doubted,
under rational conceptions of law and legislation, whether Congress
can create an office and then interpret the character of that office
in constitutional law. A court of law would investigate the set
of facts before it. It would find whether or not a Reserve Officer
were an "officer of the United States" on the basis of his appointment, his responsibilities, and his oath of office. It would very
likely pay little attention to the long sentence added by Congress in
the amendment of 1930. That long sentence gave no power, authorized no activity,--it tried to give a judicial interpretation to the
paragraph which it concluded. Whether or not a legislative body
can do this, is seriously open to question. There are many who
would say that in that phrase Congress showed its meaning,
motive, and intent, and that such is a perfectly proper procedure.
There are many others who will say that it is for Congress to
establish and create and for the courts to define and interpret,
particularly in a Constitutional question. The constitution forbids an "officer of the United States" from doing certain things.
Congress creates an "officer of the Army of the United States"
and then attempts to relieve him from the constitutional prohibition by adding that such a person shall not be considered to be
such an officer of the United States. They might as well have
tried to say with regard to the National Industrial Recovery Act
that all transactions referred to in that act should be "held or
OlVide ut supra note 32.
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deemed" to be in inter-state commerce, and therefore within the
power of Congress to control.
It is obvious that a person's quality as "an officer of the United
States" inherent in his being a reserve officer, is most likely to be
challenged in state electoral, legislative, administrative and even
judicial circles in accordance with state constitutions and state
laws (as in Vermont and Minnesota) rather than in federal courts.
Consequently we are likely to have various interpretations and
varying answers in different states. This variety will not give a
general "answer" to the question, nor is it likely to give a final
answer even in an individual state jurisdiction, for the state may
move to change its own constitution or law, as was done in Texas.
There is sufficient doubt of the propriety of such advance
legislative interpretation of a legislative enactment, that there would
be considerable interest in seeing it brought before a court. Such
a contingency, however, seems remote. As long as the executive
departments of the government continue to act as though the
legislative interpretation were correct, the question is not likely
to get into court and secure clear judicial determination. When I
was preparing an article a year ago on the subject of military
training in land-grant colleges, and it came out that the Supreme
Court was still considering the Hamilton Case, an old friend who is
professionally a constitutional lawyer of wide repute and much
influence said: "I always wait until I learn what the learned fathers
think about something they have never thought of before." And
so, in this instance, should one wait? Waiting is not productive,
for it appears that the case will never come into court. We can
only consider it as it is, an interesting problem in constitutional
law, and one which will probably always be open to argument because it will be one that will probably never be conclusively settled
by judicial decision and final opinion.
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